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Abstract
If conscious observers are to be included in the quantum mechanical
universe, we need to find the rules that engage observers with quantum
mechanical systems. The author has proposed five rules that are dis-
covered by insisting on empirical completeness; that is, by requiring the
rules to draw empirical information from Schro¨dinger’s solutions that is
more complete than is currently possible with the (Born) probability inter-
pretation. I discard Born’s interpretation, introducing probability solely
through probability current. These rules tell us something about brains.
They require the existence of observer brain states that are neither con-
scious nor unconscious. I call them ‘ready’ brain states because they are
on stand-by, ready to become conscious the moment they are stochasti-
cally chosen. Two of the rules are selection rules involving ready brain
states. The place of these rules in a wider theoretical context is discussed.
Introduction
Physicists have been overwhelmingly successful when it comes to matching en-
sembles of data with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. But
quantum mechanics does not know how to represent physical systems that con-
tain conscious sub-systems, and it cannot adequately portray conscious observa-
tions of ‘individual’ processes. If an observer watches a detector during a period
of time in which a single particle might be captured, his experience can be sum-
marized in two parts. (i) He will first see the detector in its original state D0
prior to a particle capture, and (ii) if there is a capture, he will see the detector
jump to an excited state D1. The trouble with quantum mechanics is that it
cannot predict, represent, or describe this simple two-part phenomenon. This is
because conventional quantum mechanics does not tell us how conscious brain
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states fold into the methodology of the theory. Quantum mechanics is an empir-
ical science that does a thorough job of predicting ensemble behavior; however,
it should also be able to predict everything about an individual experience that
is consistent with ‘quantum reality’. We will show below that quantum theory
does not do that when conscious states become involved. To fulfill this simple
requirement, the empirical predictions of the theory must be extended beyond
their present limited range.
This has been done by the author in a series of four papers [1, 2, 3, 4] that
propose five rules that apply to a variety of interactions like the one described
above. These rules are not intended to be an interpretation of quantum theory,
or a pedagogy of quantum theory; but rather, they are descriptions of how
conscious states become engaged with physical systems. As such, they are
synthetic statements about Nature that are shown to improve on the (current)
connection between theory and observation. More will be said below about how
these rules might relate to a wider theoretical understanding.
The validity of these rules rests on several assumptions:
A. Every object in the universe is a quantum mechanical system or subsys-
tem. So atoms, black holes, and in particular “brains” are quantum mechanical
objects. This includes conscious brains no less than unconscious brains.
B. In the interaction to be studied, we assume that every component of the
detector interacts with a separate component of the (conscious or not) brain
of the observer. Therefore, brain variables become entangled with detector
variables.
C. All of the quantum mechanical uncertainties that are a property of an
ensemble are also a property of each member of the ensemble. This means
that the wave function ψ of a particle describes the probability properties of an
individual particle, as well as the statistical behavior of an ensemble of those
particles.
It will be shown in Part I of this paper that these assumptions, plus a
requirement that (i) and (ii) are predicted by the proposed rules, imply that
there exists a brain state that is neither conscious nor unconscious. I call it
a ready brain state. There is no classical analog. However, in the context
considered, it will be clearly demonstrated that if conscious brains exist, then
ready brains exist. The properties of a ready brain state are described in Part I,
and are spelled out more completely in refs. 1-4.
In the above example, the observer has one experience before capture and
another experience after capture. Corresponding to this, the proposed rules
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give us one solution prior to capture, and another solution after capture. In
order to achieve this “dual” solution, our rules must make a statement about
the probability of capture that is qualified by time. This is accomplished by
shifting the notion of probability from that of ‘square modulus’, to that of the
probability per unit time – or probability current. In this treatment, square
modulus has no intrinsic physical significance, so the Born interpretation is
abandoned. Only current flow is now considered to be physically meaningful.
This is not inconsistent with the way that the Born probability interpretation
has been successfully applied as will be demonstrated in Part I.
According to von Neumann, state reduction in quantum mechanics means
an irreversible change that occurs during a measurement [5]. This corresponds
to a change that carries a pure quantum mechanical state into a mixture. It
therefore replaces one kind of ensemble with another kind of ensemble. Mea-
surement in this sense is now thought to occur the moment two components of
a subsystem are sufficiently distinguishable that their correlated environments
are orthogonal to one another. The cross term is therefore zero when the en-
vironmental variables are integrated out. This means that the components of
the subsystem are locally incoherent, so the object in its various possible states
takes on classical statistical properties. Joos and Zeh call the resulting subsys-
tem an improper mixture [6], and the process is referred to as environmental
decoherence [7, 8, 9, 10]. For a measurement of this kind, no conscious observer
needs to be present; and indeed, nothing happens during this measurement that
is external to the Schro¨dinger process. This means that the universe will re-
main a superposition that is undisturbed by decoherence. It is a physicist who
chooses the subsystem and decides to trace out its environment. Nature does
not eliminate the environment or any other part of the wave function during
this so-called measurement, and it does not destroy or in any way alter the
superposition of the total system. Therefore, there is no objective “collapse” of
the wave function associated with decoherence.
It may still be meaningful to speak of an observerless measurement through
decoherence, but the important question here is: What happens when a con-
scious observer is present? It is my claim that a conscious observer whose brain
states are part of a larger system will interact uniquely with the system; and the
resulting measurement will bring about a genuine ‘collapse’ of the wave function
that is described in refs. 1-4 and Part I of this paper. This collapse is like the
R-process of Penrose, but is different in ways that will become apparent as we
proceed.
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Motivation
As stated above, one motivation behind this effort has been to find the rules
that engage conscious states with quantum mechanical systems, and to fully
describe an observer’s conscious experience in individual cases. There is another
motivation. For 400 years physics has confined its attention to the ‘objective’
world, refraining from any serious consideration of the corresponding ‘subjective’
world. I believe that will change. I believe that we will see the development of
theoretical tools that will enable physicists to reach across the Cartesian divide,
stitching it together with a proper mind/body theory. The rules that I propose
are not such a theory. They are only a set of ad hoc rules that bridge the gap,
for they lack the elegance of a broad based theory. However, I believe that these
rules, or rules like them, will be part of the stitching in any correct mind-body
theoretical framework. They will relate to that theory in the same way that
the Balmer series relates to atomic theory. Like any empirical formula by itself,
these rules are only a step; but I believe they are a step in the direction of a
better theoretical understanding.
There is still another motivation that is actually the original motivation.
Before I attempted the write these rules I was convinced of the correctness of the
parallel principle, and (what I now call) rule (5) which implements that principle
in a special case. This will be explained in Part II of this paper; but briefly,
rule (5) establishes a physical basis for the evolution of the so-called psycho-
physical parallelism, which refers to the way that subjective reality parallels or
mirrors objective reality. Whatever may come of these rules, I believe that the
parallel principle is the key to making inroads into any trans-Cartesian theory.
PART I
Part I of this paper is a summary of the findings in refs. 1 and 2. In
these two papers, four of the five proposed rules are formulated and
applied in different gedanken experimental situations.
Interaction
In the absence of an observer, the state of the above described particle/detector
system is given by Φ(t) = exp(−iHt)ψiDi, where ψi and Di are the initial
states of the incoming particle and the detector, and H is the Hamiltonian
divided by h¯ . Because H includes an interaction term between ψ and D, the
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resulting state Φ(t) is an entanglement in which the particle variables and the
detector variables are not separable. However, Φ(t) is a superposition (in the
representation considered) so we can group its components in any way that we
like. I form two major components: (1) those detector states D0 in which there
is no particle capture, and (2) those detector states D1(t) in which there is
a particle capture. Let ψ(t) represent the free particle as a function of time,
including all the incoming and scattering components. It is therefore entangled
with D0. But since the detector is macroscopic, we may approximate D0 to be
a constant that can be factored out of ψ(t). The captured particle is included
in the component D1(t). This gives
Φ(t ≥ t0) = ψ(t)D0 +D1(t) (1)
where D1(t) is equal to zero at t0 and increases in time, whereas ψ(t)D0 is
normalized to one at t0 and decreases in time.
Equation 1 ignores the orthogonal environmental terms that are attached to
each component. These are responsible for decoherence that causes the com-
ponents to become incoherent almost as soon as the second one comes into
existence. The reader is reminded that the superposition in eq. 1 is not de-
stroyed by this process. It is preserved because it represents the state of the
entire universe, where the (not shown) environmental terms attached to each
component have not been eliminated.
It is here that I depart from the Penrose gravitational approach that would
couple his R-collapse of the superposition to the onset of decoherence between
these two very different detector states [11]. This collapse would occur almost as
soon as the interaction begins, so the parameters of the interaction would have
no opportunity to influence the time at which the particle is captured. This
cannot be correct, for it would short circuit the normal Hamiltonian dynamics
of the interaction.
Contrary to this, I say that the superposition in eq. 1 will last as long as
is necessary for the interaction to run its course. The timing of a collapse
(i.e., a particle capture) is determined by the probability current flowing from
the first to the second component, and that is determined by the rate at which
the particle wave approaches and overlaps the detector at each moment. For
low-level radioactive emissions yielding particle waves that are spread widely
over space, the interaction in eq. 1 might last for hours or days. In that case,
the superposition will last for hours or days. So the ‘time’ of a particle capture
in this treatment is not a function of decoherence or gravitational thresholds.
It is, and should be, a function of the parameters of the incoming particle and
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the cross section of the particle with the detector[12].
A Conscious Observer
If an observer interacts with the detector during the above interaction, then
assumptions A and B tell us that two different components of the brain will be
involved. One of these (B0) will be entangled with D0, and the other (B1) will
be entangled with D1. Equation 1 then becomes
Φ(t ≥ t0) = ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(t)B1
where again, D1(t)B1 is equal to zero at t0.
Penrose says that brain superpositions like these cannot exist for any percep-
tible length of time without an “objective reduction” (see ref. 11, pp. 342, 355).
But the argument that we applied to the above detector applies equally to a
macroscopic brain. The superposition in this equation cannot be immediately
reduced because that would abort the normal Hamiltonian dynamics. The tim-
ing of the collapse (i.e., the particle capture) should be determined by the rate
at which the particle approaches and engages the detector/brain subsystem, not
by the decoherence or gravitational properties of the brain.
For these reasons we dismiss the Penrose theory, but now there is another
problem. The above equation is as far as the Schro¨dinger process can go. It is a
theoretical dead-end that does not portray the dual experience of the observer.
It does not tell us which brain state is conscious, or exclude the possibility that
they might both be simultaneously conscious. The equation is also reminiscent
of the Schro¨dinger cat paradox that suggests that there are competing probabil-
ities between D0 and D1 for the conscious attention of the observer. And finally,
it encourages the belief that quantum mechanics can only be applied to ensem-
bles. But if quantum mechanics is to be a complete empirical science (consistent
with quantum reality), then it must fully describe the dual experience of this
observer, clarify the above ambiguities as to which states are conscious, and it
must do so in individual cases.
The solutions to Schro¨dinger’s equations of motion are normally connected
to laboratory data through a single rule: The Born Rule (i.e., the Born inter-
pretation). However, this rule is incomplete as well as technically wrong as will
be shown. It does not ground the Schro¨dinger solution as fully as possible to
laboratory observations. We therefore need to replace the Born rule by other
rule(s) that make more complete connections. These are the rules proposed in
this paper.
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We proceed by anticipating a satisfactory resolution of the above difficul-
ties. The desired result should include two solutions: one that applies before
particle capture, and one that applies after (possible) particle capture. Particle
capture is occasioned by the system making a stochastic choice, and the time
that that happens is given by tsc. The two solutions will then take the form:
Φ(tsc > t ≥ t0) and Φ(t ≥ tsc > t0), where the first of these is
Φ(tsc > t ≥ t0) = ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(t)B1 (2)
The underline means that B0 is conscious, and the lack of underline under B1
means that it is not conscious. The observational significance of this equation
is clear. It describes the experience of the observer prior to capture.
The existence of the second component in eq. 2 may seem to introduce an
ambiguity, but there is no empirical ambiguity because the observer is unaware
of it. The second component is only on standby, ready to take over if and when
the particle is captured by the detector. It is the “ready” brain state referred
to above. It is physiologically capable of consciousness, but only when it is
stochastically chosen. Until then, it is neither conscious nor unconscious, and
is unique to a quantum mechanical superposition. The moment we distinguish
B0 from B1 by saying that one is conscious and the other is not, we confirm the
existence of such a state. This is what I meant by saying, “if conscious brains
exist, then ready brains exist”1.
Schro¨dinger’s equation applies continuously in eq. 2, increasing the square
modulus of the second component at the expense of the first. This decrease
in amplitude of the first component does not affect the ‘quality’ of the con-
scious experience of the observer associated with B0. Subjective intensity, for
example, is not diminished during this decrease of square modulus as one would
expect from classical physics. Generally speaking, the qualitative properties of
a quantum mechanical state are determined by the intrinsic parameters of the
state, and have nothing to do with its amplitude. So an observers awareness of
a conscious state like B0 is either on or it is off. It is on if the square modulus
is positive, and off if it is zero.
Particle Capture — A Stochastic Hit
Probability current flowing from the first to the second component in eq. 2
represents the probability per unit time that there will be a stochastic hit on
1Our rules (3) & (4) will dispose of the second component of eq. 2 if a second observer
observes the detector, or if the attention of the primary observer drifts in any way.
7
the second component, and that corresponds to a particle being captured by
the detector. When that happens, our rule (3) – given in the next section – will
provide that the second component becomes consciousness
ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(t)B1 −→ ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(t)B1
and that simultaneously the first component goes to zero. Therefore, the
stochastic hit produces a second equation (following directly from eq. 2) given
by
Φ(t ≥ tsc > t0) = D1B1 (3)
Here again the situation is clear: The observer is consciously aware of the de-
tector in its ‘capture’ mode. Equations 2 and 3 are the dual solutions that our
adopted rules draw from the dead-end of the Schro¨dinger solution by itself.
The First Three Rules
Equations 2 and 3 follow from the first three of our rules. The first provides
for the existence of a stochastic trigger, the second provides for the existence of
ready brain states, and the third provides for the collapse of the state function.
Rule (1): For any subsystem of n components in an isolated system with a
square modulus equal to s, the probability per unit time of a stochastic choice of
one of those components at time t is given by (ΣnJn)/s, where the net probability
current Jn going into the nth component at that time is positive
2.
Rule (2): If the Hamiltonian gives rise to new components that are not
classically continuous with the old components or with each other, then all active
brain states that are included in the new components will be ready brain states.
[note: an “active” brain state is either conscious or ready.]
Rule (3): If a component that is entangled with a ready brain state B is
stochastically chosen, then B will become conscious, and all other components
will be immediately reduced to zero.
2An isolated system is thought of as not interacting with the rest of the universe. If one
wants to determine if the two components in eq. 1 are locally coherent or incoherent, then
the effect of the environmental terms must be considered. But if one only wants to find the
probability per unit time of a stochastic hit on either component, it is sufficient to treat them
as an isolated system (i.e., ignoring the environmental terms). Of course, the system will also
be isolated if the environmental terms are included, so the probability is not affected by the
decision to include or not to include the environmental terms. An isolated system is part of
the environment of another isolated system.
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Rule (1) insures that there will be a stochastic hit on the second compo-
nent of eq. 2. The basis representation of the reduction is provided through
rule (2) which insures that the second component in eq. 2 is a ready brain state.
Rule (3) converts eq. 2 to eq. 3. Therefore, these rules go directly and uniquely
from the solution of Schro¨dinger’s equation to the empirical predictions that
lie beyond that solution by itself; that is, to the dual phenomenon represented
by eqs. 2 and 3. The rules supplement the Schro¨dinger solutions by replacing
the Born rule. This is necessary if the theory is to give a full account of the
‘quantum’ reality of observers.
I am not concerned with the question of why these rules work, but only that
they do work. They work in the simple sense that they include the observer in
the quantum mechanical universe, and they ground the Schro¨dinger solutions
to laboratory observations as completely as possible. Empirical accountability
is the only constraint that I impose in the above example and in all of the other
examples considered in refs. 1 and 2. This severely narrows the possibilities
and therefore defines the rules rather sharply. Understanding them will have to
wait until there is a proper theory of brain states and/or a more general trans-
Cartesian theory. I believe that these rules will naturally emerge out of such a
theory when it is found. For instance, rule (2) is a selection rule that forbids the
brains Hamiltonian from producing a discrete conscious brain state. I assume
that a correct theory of brains will put this rule into an understandable context,
and that rule (3) will also seem less ad hoc with the development of the wider
theoretical framework.
Everett’s Many Worlds
The above rules forbid Everett’s many-world interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. Rule #2 does not allow discrete conscious states to be created except
by stochastic choice; and when that occurs, all of the other components go to
zero. Therefore, this treatment does not allow the consciousness of an observer
to exist simultaneously in more than one component of a superposition. This
negates Everett’s claim that a conscious observer can coexist with other con-
scious versions of himself as ‘they’ evolve together along separate branches of
the universal state function. The observer in each branch is said to have no
direct knowledge of the other versions of himself.
Everett’s conjecture is the result of a theory of physics that is not properly
grounded in experience. It seems plausible only because the Born rule by itself
does not tie Schro¨dinger’s solutions to laboratory observations as completely as
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it should. This leaves room for the imaginative and unwarranted wanderings
that take us into the many unobservable worlds of Everett.
A Terminal Observation
In a typical laboratory experiment, the observer interacts with the detector
only after the interaction is complete; and at that time, the equation of state
is generally given a Born interpretation. That is, the square modulus of each
component is said to equal the probability of finding the state in that component.
But we say in this treatment that probability enters only through probability
current, so the Born rule cannot be directly employed. However, when rules
(1-3) are applied to a terminal observation, it is shown below that the Born rule
is upheld, even though it is not itself fundamental.
When the interaction is complete at a time tf , and before the observer has
looked at the detector, the system in eq. 1 will stabilize to
Φ(t > tf ) = {ψ(t)D0 +D1(tf )}X (4)
where X is the unknown brain state of the observer prior to his interacting with
the detector. At the moment tob of observation, rule (2) requires that eq. 4
becomes
Φ(t ≥ tob > tf ) = ψ(t)D0X +D1(tf )X (5)
+ ψ′(t)D0B0 +D
′
1(tf )B1
where the primed components in the second row are zero at tob, and ready brain
states B0 and B1 are entangled with detector states D0 and D1 in accordance
with assumption B. There are as yet no new conscious states.
The interaction in eq. 5 is entirely physiological, where probability current
J flows from the components in the first row to components in the second row.
J0 < 0 and J1 < 0 J
′
0 > 0 and J
′
1 > 0
So far, the interaction is determined by standard quantum mechanics, plus
assumptionsA andB and rule (2). It is at this point that we apply rules (1 & 3).
Rule (1) assures us that there will be a stochastic hit on one of the two primed
components during the physiological response. Setting n = 2,
∫
dt[J ′0 + J
′
1] = total probability of a hit = 1
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where currents J ′0 and J
′
1 flow until the physiological interaction is complete.
When one of the primed components is stochastically chosen, rule (3) causes
the affected ready state to become conscious and drives the other component
to zero. This reflects the laboratory experience in two parts: (1) the third
component in eq. 5 is chosen with a probability equal to
∫
dtJ ′0, and (2) the fourth
component is chosen with a probability equal to
∫
dtJ ′1. The probability of one
of the components being chosen is therefore the same as that given by the Born
rule. However, that rule is replaced by one that introduces probability only when
current flows from the system in the first row of eq. 5 to the observer/system
in the second row of eq. 5.
Our rules now adequately describe the observers experience when he inter-
acts with the detector before the beginning of the particle/detector interaction,
as well as after that interaction is complete. It is shown in ref. 1 that the rules
also work if the observer enters the picture during the particle/detector inter-
action. So in all of the ways that an observer can become involved with the
system, the rules pull additional (and correct) empirical information from the
theory.
Boundary Conditions
Rule (3) provides for a ‘collapse’ of the wave function when an observer is
present. It requires the elimination of components. This is not an ensemble-to-
ensemble reduction; but rather, it is a change that is discontinuously inflicted on
an individual system in which one or more components are made to disappear.
I call it a boundary reduction, because is has the effect of discontinuously chang-
ing the boundary conditions of the solution to Schro¨dinger’s equation. The
Hamiltonian does not undergo change during this reduction, but the solution
on which it operates undergoes change.
The boundary conditions of the universe emerging from the big bang are
indeterminate with respect to position or direction. Throughout the inflationary
period there are no concrete markers that distinguish one part of the universe
from another. A single field supposedly dominated the inflationary expansion,
and that is said to guarantee the thermodynamic sameness of the horizon of the
universe in every direction. This is the point of the ‘horizon’ argument.
So the question is: If the universe was originally so featureless, why is there
now so much differentiated structure? Suppose that the wave function of an
oxygen atom is distributed (more or less) uniformly over a volume; and simul-
taneously, that the wave function of a carbon atom is also distributed (more or
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less) uniformly over the same volume. Then in sufficient time, one would find
the wave function of a carbon monoxide molecule that is distributed (more or
less) uniformly over that volume. In the same way, the (more or less) uniformly
distributed GUT particles that emerged from the inflationary expansion will
combine in such a way that – in sufficient time – one would find wave functions
of galaxies that are (more or less) uniformly distributed throughout the uni-
verse. There is clearly something wrong with this scenario. The contemporary
universe is not quantum mechanically amorphous to this extent. This means
that there must have been post-inflation boundary conditions imposed on the
universe, and this could only have happened through a mechanism that brought
about a series of collapses of the original universal wave function. The question
then is: How did that happen? What was that mechanism?
That mechanism must be external to the equation of motion, for differential
equations cannot modify their own boundary conditions (i.e., they cannot select
one ‘eigen-galaxy’ and discard another). However, an external chooser (like our
stochastic trigger) can do that. It can say: This galaxy stays, and that one
goes.
It is therefore necessary to add a choice mechanism of some kind to the
differentially based formalisms of physics in order to provide for post-inflationary
boundary conditions. A spontaneous reduction theory like that of Ghirardi,
Rimini, and Weber would qualify, as would a gravitational reduction theory
like that of Penrose, whatever else may be said for or against these theories.
Environmental decoherence does not qualify as a mechanism because it does
not choose between ‘eigen-objects’. Of course, environmental arguments may
be used in conjunction with other theories that do qualify.
Rule (3) qualifies, for it provides a boundary-defining stochastic trigger. So
the question is: Is the rule (3) reduction a part of a more general reduction, or
is it possible that rule (3) describes the only example of a boundary reduction
in the universe? Put differently: Is a ready brain so special that it is the only
configuration of matter that is capable of responding to a stochastic hit?
Objective Reduction: Rule (1a)
It is not difficult to construct a rule that provides for the existence of bound-
ary reductions in the absence of an observer. I will call it objective reduction
rule (1a).
Rule (1a): If a component of a superposition is locally incoherent with other
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components in the superposition, and if it is stochastically chosen, then all those
other components will be immediately reduced to zero.
If rule (1a) were in play, then the first particle/detector component ψ(t)Do
in eq. 1 would become zero the moment the second component D1(t) is stochas-
tically chosen. In general, this rule would provide for an ‘observerless’ measure-
ment (including a genuine boundary defining collapse) associated with environ-
mental decoherence. In addition, this reduction would preserve Hamiltonian
dynamics, so it could not be explained by the Penrose theory without some
modification. Of course, I have not tried to ‘explain’ any of these rules. I have
only sought rules that give the right results, where explanations are left to the
possibility of a wider theoretical framework. The trouble is, the observer cannot
generally know if rule (1a) gives any result at all; for the effect of the rule is
experimentally indistinguishable from the effect of rules (1-3) by themselves.
Rule (1a) applies in the absence of an observer, but the above rules (1-3)
are still required when an observer is present. We need rule (1) in any case, to
provide a stochastic trigger. In addition, rule (2) is necessary to provide for the
existence of ready brain states during active observation, and rule (3) is needed
to turn a stochastically chosen ready brain state into a conscious state. Rules
(4) and (5) will also be found to apply in the presence of an observer, and will
be in play with or without rule (1a). Therefore, when an observer is present,
rule (1a) is superfluous; and when an observer is not present, the effects of
rule (1a) cannot be observed. The choice is to adopt rule (1a) together with
a modification of rule (3) that does not provide for a separate reduction [call
it rule (3mod)], or to adopt the rules (1-3) as originally stated. The observer
cannot tell the difference3. In another paper [13], it is shown that the difference
is unobservable in all of the examples that have been worked out in refs. (1-2).
3If an earlier boundary condition is uniquely correlated with a later observation, and if
the observation is stochastically chosen by the rules (1-3) proposed above, then it will be
impossible for the observer to know if the earlier boundary was also chosen by an earlier
application of rule (1a). This will be true even if the boundary is not uniquely correlated
with the observation. Causal correlations that connect back to a range of possible earlier
‘incoherent’ boundaries will result in uncertainty in the boundary conditions that led to the
observation. So the precise nature of the earlier boundary cannot be verified by the observer,
and there will be no reason for him to believe that any one of those possible boundaries was
(or was not) the only boundary by virtue of an earlier rule (1a) reduction. Therefore, to this
extent, the effects of rule (1a) are empirically indistinguishable from the effects of rule (3).
An exception may be possible if causal connections go back to a range of earlier ‘coherent’
boundaries; however, an example like this is worked out in ref. 13 with results that also support
indistinguishably.
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This choice of rule (1a) or rule (3) will be decided by determining which best
fits into a wider theoretical framework. It is my belief that the missing link in all
of this is a genuine trans-Cartesian connection. The brain is special because it
supports consciousness, and when we have finally understood this phenomenon
it is my belief that we will also have the theoretical framework that will favor
the rules that exploit the uniqueness of a ready brain state – that is, the rules
as originally given.
This is the view put forward von Neumann, Wigner, London and Bauer.
It does not mean that consciousness ‘causes’ state reduction as is sometimes
said; but rather, that there is a common cause of both. Rule (3) says that
a stochastic hit on a ready brain state gives rise to both consciousness and a
boundary reduction. It is the cause of both.
The remainder of this paper does not require the reader to accept this point
of view. Having stated my position, I return to the primarily question concerning
what happens when a conscious observer is involved in an interaction – not with
what might happen otherwise 4,5,6,7.
4There is one consequence of this idea concerning the importance of an observer that people
find incredible. It is that there may be significant parts of the universe that remain quantum
mechanically amorphous because they still haven’t been observed by a conscious observer –
as for instance, large parts of the surface of Venus. I agree that this is incredible. But it is no
more so than many other things about quantum mechanics – as for instance, the diffraction
properties of a single particle.
5I do not accept Penrose’s reduction criterion because I see no reason why a metrical
superposition should not exist so long as all of its components are mapped onto the same
topological space. However, I agree that the singularities associated with the centers of black
holes cannot be plausibly superimposed. Therefore, the appearance of a black hole must have
established a boundary condition that uniquely located its center and excluded everything
else from that location. This must be an exception to the ‘observer’ requirement, for it means
that the positions of most galaxies (and the spaces between them) were probably determined
long before the appearance of ready brains and rule (3) boundary reductions.
6My rejection of Penrose’s R-process should not reflect on the Penrose-Hameroff idea that
coherent superpositions within microtubules might have something to do with consciousness,
or brain readiness. That may or may not be the case.
7If the environment of a system contains another system that undergoes a state reduction
by either rule (1a) or rule 3, then the square modulus s of the entire system may change (i.e.,
decrease) in the middle of the primary interaction that is being considered. This amounts to a
mid-interaction change in boundary conditions, and will be accompanied by a corresponding
change (i.e., decrease) in the current flowing into each component. Since rule (1) involves
the ratio of J/s, and applies at each moment of time, the new boundary will not effect the
probability per unit time. This means that rule (1) will correctly apply with one value of
s before the environmental reduction, and with another value of s after the reduction. In
general, the square modulus of an isolated system that includes environmental terms may
decrease rapidly due to environmental state reductions. Although rule (1) is completely valid
in this fluid situation, it will be easier to stabilize s by treating (isolated) systems in which
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Two Observes – Rule (4)
We have seen that rules (1-3) work well in all of the ways that an observer
might interact with the particle/detector system in eq. 1. These rules also work
well in all of the ways that two observers might interact with the system – with
one exception. Rules (1-3) by themselves give rise to an anomaly that must be
remedied. To this end, a fourth rule is added that puts an important restriction
on ready brain states.
Suppose the first observer is on board with the detector from the beginning
as in eq. 2, and let the interaction terminate without a capture. The equation
would then take the form
Φ(t > tf ) = {ψ(t)D0B0 +D1(tf )B1}X
where tf is the time that the particle/observer interaction ends, and X repre-
sents the brain state of the second observer who has not yet interacted with the
system. The first term in a product like B1X will refer to the first observer,
and the second term will refer to the second observer. Current has stopped
flowing at this stage, so physically, it corresponds to the observer just staring
at the detector with no hope that the particle can still be detected – since the
interaction was over at tf . The second observer then looks at the detector at
time tob(2) which, according to rule (2), gives
Φ(t ≥ tob(2) > tf ) = ψ(t)D0B0X +D1(tf )B1X (6)
+ ψ′(t)D0B0B0 +D
′
1(tf )B1B1
where current now flows into the primed components in the second row that are
equal to zero at tob(2). If there is a stochastic hit on the third component in eq. 6,
the resulting state equation will immediately become ψ′(t ≥ tob(2))D0B0B0,
which corresponds to both observers witnessing the detector state D0 that has
been passed over without a particle capture. However, if there is a stochastic hit
on the fourth component in eq. 6, the state equation will become D′1(tf )B1B1,
according to which both observers witness a particle capture. But that is impos-
sible, since the first observer can testify that the interaction has already ended
without a capture. Therefore, the latter transition must be forbidden. This is
accomplished in a general way by requiring another selection rule that reflects
the properties of the brain’s Hamiltonian.
the environmental terms have been excluded.
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Rule (4): A transition between two components is forbidden if each is an
entanglement containing a ready brain state of the same observer.
There is an entangled ready brain state B1 of the first observer appearing
in both the second and the fourth components of eq. 6. Rule (4) therefore says
that no current can flow between them, so the anomalous state D′1(tf )B1B1
cannot be chosen. It is shown in ref. 1 that the fourth component in eq. 6 will
not even appear in that equation. It is also shown in ref. 1 that rules (1-4)
work perfectly well in all of the ways that two observers might interact with the
system and with each other – and there are now no exceptions8.
The rules so far do four notable things. (1) They impose boundary
conditions that contribute to the structured universe of our experi-
ence, and (2) they draw empirical content from quantum mechanics
(e.g., the duel phenomenon) that is not predicted by the Schro¨dinger
theory plus the Born rule. (3) They amend the Born rule to apply to
probability current rather than square modulus. One consequence of
this is that there is no need to insist on the normalization of system
states. And finally, (4) these rules give conscious observers a way
to engage quantum mechanical systems. In the process, they intro-
duce non-classical ready brain states that have a crucial but limited
role to play. These are brought into existence by the second rule,
they are stochastically chosen by the third rule, and their influence
is limited by the fourth rule. If nothing else, ready brains define the
basis states of a boundary reduction.
Schro¨dingers Cat Experiment
No new rules or assumptions are introduced in ref. 2, where we turn attention
to the famed Schro¨dinger cat experiment. The cat presents us with a different
operational situation that can be used to further test the rules and assumptions
that have already been adopted. They all pass the test.
There are two versions of the Schro¨dinger cat experiment. In version I, a
conscious cat interacts with a device that splits it into two components. In the
first component the cat is made unconscious, and in the second it remains con-
scious. This is another case in which the equations of motion give rise to a single
8In eq. 6, the probability of a capture is found by applying rule (1) with n = 1 to the
second component prior to tf . The probability of no capture is found by applying rule (1)
with n = 1 to the third component after tob(2). The sum will equal 1.0.
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solution without resolving the question of the consciousness or unconsciousness
of the brain states that are involved. When our rules (1-4) are applied to this
case, they again tease out two solutions: one corresponding to the case in which
there is a stochastic hit that leaves the cat unconscious, and one in which there
is no stochastic hit, leaving the cat fully conscious.
The rules also resolve all issues that might arise when an outside observer
is brought into the picture. The observer can be injected into the scene before
there has been a stochastic choice, or during the operation of the mechanical
devise that renders the cat unconscious, or after the experiment is over. In all of
these cases the rules correctly predict the conscious experience of the observer
and the cat, leaving no ambiguity of the kind that typifies the Schro¨dinger
solution by itself.
In version II, the cat is initially unconscious and is made to interact with
a device that splits it into two components. In the first component the cat is
aroused to consciousness, and in the second it remains unconscious. Again we
examine what happens when an outside observer interacts with the system at
any time during the experiment. In all of these cases, rules (1-4) convert the
Schro¨dinger solution into a correct description of the conscious experience of
the observer and the cat. Here again, the rules remove all of the ambiguity
that normally plague quantum mechanical solutions when conscious beings are
involved.
Finally in ref. 2, the version II cat is assumed to have an internal alarm
that competes with the external alarm, where each is capable of arousing the
cat. Rules (1-4) correctly describe the cats various experiences in these circum-
stances. Again an external observer is allowed to intercede at any time during
the experiment; and again, the rules resolve all of the quantum mechanical
paradoxes that are usually associated with the Schro¨dinger cat.
These rules work as well as they do in the cat experiments because they
properly ground the Schro¨dinger solutions in experience, leaving no fuzzy am-
biguities.
17
PART II
Part II is a summary of the findings in refs. 3 and 4. In these two
papers we take account of the fact that a conscious brain state cannot
be sharply defined, so it must have a pulse-like nature.
A Conscious Pulse
References 1-2 make the unrealistic assumption that brain states have sharply
defined physiological variables. But any real conscious state will span a range
of physiological states, so refs 3-4 define the properties of a brain pulse.
In ref. 3, rule (3) is amended to accommodate this change. The amendment
is called rule (3a), and it asserts that when a conscious state is stochastically
chosen it dissolves into a pulse of states that reflect the brains limits of res-
olution. This dissolution is affected by the brain’s Hamiltonian. In any final
presentation of the rules, rule (3a) will be joined with rule (3) to give a full
account of what happens when there is a boundary reduction. The other rules
are not affected by a change to pulses from sharply defined states.
It is shown in ref. 3 that when an observer tries to distinguish between two
apparatus eigenvalues that are too close to be resolved by a conscious pulse,
the superposition containing these two eigenvalues cannot be fully reduced by
rules (1-4). The sharpness of the reduction depends on the extent to which the
resolution curve overlaps the two eigenvalues. In general, the observation of a
superposition results in another superposition, due to resolution difficulties.
Reference 4 continues the discussion of the properties of a conscious pulse,
but with the addition of the final rule (5). To explain this, we need to first
introduce some ideas concerning the relationship of consciousness to physiology.
The Parallel Principle
It is generally accepted that the subjective world of our personal experience
corresponds in critical ways with the objective world that exists outside of our-
selves. It is assumed that formal relationships can be found in the subjective
world that parallel or mirror the formal relationships that exist in the objective
world – and this is the basis of epistemology in physics. Von Neumann calls
it the psycho-physical parallelism. Why a psycho-physical parallelism should
exist at all is open to question, inasmuch as these two separate realms of re-
ality have such different natures. There is no obvious reason why one of these
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worlds should pay attention to the fortunes or machinations of the other. Re-
sponding to this point, Leibniz claimed that we are compelled to believe in a
Pre-established Harmony between these realms that is arranged by God.
Opposed to this, the parallel principle says that the psycho-physical par-
allelism is the consequence of natural evolutionary processes. It claims that
the conscious evolution of a species develops in parallel with the physiological
evolution of the species; and for this to happen, there must be an interaction be-
tween consciousness and physiology. The general mechanism for this interaction
is described in a previous paper [14].
The rules that have been considered so far allow one to believe that con-
sciousness is only epiphenomenal: that is, it may be regarded as an insubstantial
by-product of physiology that has no counter-influence of its own. It is possible
to believe that consciousness just tags along with the rule (3) reduction that is
set in motion by the stochastic choice in rule (1). But for the parallel principle
to work, consciousness must do more than tag along. It must do something. It
must have an influence on physiology. Its presence must give an evolutionary
preference to one kind of physiology over another, and to achieve this we adopt
rule (5).
The mechanisms for this influence are likely to be quite involved, so I nar-
rowed down my considerations to just one kind of consciousness – pain con-
sciousness. It is possible that the first conscious experience of a species was
‘pain’; but for pain to be influential there must be a behavioral consequence
when it appears. If that behavior is beneficial to the species in its evolutionary
struggle, then a parallelism will be established between the appearance of pain
and a response that is beneficial to the species.
The logic of this argument may seem to be obvious and well known. But the
implications are dramatic if two things are made clear. First, the term ‘pain’ is
not a euphemism for just another physiological sub-routine. Pain here refers to
the subjective experience itself, considered as something apart from physiology.
It that were not so, the parallel principle would not work. If all causal influences
were basically physiological, then there is no reason why subjective experience
should in any way parallel or mirror the physical world. Subjective impressions
and images would then lead their own irrelevant existence. They might be
stimulated by physiology, but their content would be nonsensical. Therefore,
for there to be a disciplined relationship between physiology and consciousness,
there must be a meaningful interaction between the two. Second, the term ‘pain’
for one species may not have the same qualitative significance as pain for another
species. The psycho-physical parallelism does not depend on this ‘quality’, but
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requires only that a certain kind of conscious experience is associated with a
certain kind of behavior, and that this combination is an evolutionary success.
Therefore, all we have to do is establish that a conscious experience of some
kind has a lawful influence on behavior, and evolution will do the rest. The
parallel principle will be satisfied.
When I say ‘pain’ in the following, I refer to an experience that arose some-
where in the evolutionary past of the subject species, and became correlated
with a successful behavioral response. To achieve this kind of success, I claim
that pain itself (not a physiological substitute) must alter physiological brain
states. If there are no behavioral consequences of this alteration, then the
newly introduced phenomenon will be of no consequence, and will fade away
over time as a useless subjective appendage. However, if there are behavioral
consequences, then evolution will shape those consequences in such a way as to
validate the parallel principle.
The mechanism for this physiological influence is to be found in the structure
of the conscious pulse. It is assumed that the primordial organism has the
conscious experience in question (i.e., pain), and that this manifests itself in a
conscious pulse of finite width. Reference 4 has a detailed discussion of how
such a pulse might be formed, and how its participating states will be spread
over a range of greater or lesser pain.
Square
Modulus
r
Conscious Pulse of Pain States
The accompanying figure shows that pulse as a function of a variable r,
which (according to the formation mechanism that I imagined) is proportional
to the number of opiate receptors that are occupied by molecules that stimu-
late receptor activity (see refs. 4, 14). A stimulated opiate receptor supports
euphoria and/or analgesia. This means that the leading edge of the pulse refers
to conscious states that are less painful than the states in the trailing edge. We
then introduce rule (5)
Rule (5): If two states within a conscious pulse represent different degrees
of pain, then the square modulus of the state with lesser pain will increase at the
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expense of the state with the greater pain.
Because the trailing edge states are the more painful of the two, rule (5)
will cause the leading edge in the figure to grow at the expense of the trailing
edge. As a result, the pulse will drift to the right as indicated by the arrow. So
rule (5) brings about a migration of the brain’s conscious pulse that will result
in physiological changes that may very well result in behavioral changes. Again,
see details in refs. 4 and 14. The organism may therefore be altered in a way
that may in the long run be beneficial to the species. If that happens, then
it will be genetically established that pain will be associated with a behavioral
response that furthers the survival of the species. This will be the beginning
of a psycho-physical parallelism, established in accordance with the parallel
principle.
Experimental Test
If rule (5) is correct, then there will be physical consequences that should be
observable in principle. A test of rule (5) is proposed by the author in another
paper where two experiments are suggested: (1) a PET (Positron Emission To-
mography) scan of a human subject experiencing pain, and (2) an autoradiogra-
phy of a rat experiencing pain [15]. I will briefly describe the PET experiment.
Agonists molecules attach to opiate receptors and stimulate a response that
is recognized by the subject as euphoria and/or anesthesia. Antagonist molecules
also attach to these receptors, but their only effect is to block the attachment
of agonist molecules. In this experiment, a subject experiencing pain is injected
with a certain ratio of opiate agonist to antagonist molecules, where one or the
other is radioactively labeled. The extent of positron emission is then measured
in parts of the brain where there are high densities of opiate receptors. There
are four separate scans.
(a) the agonist is labeled and the dose is pharmacological.
(b) the antagonist is labeled and the dose is pharmacological.
(c) the agonist is labeled and the dose is subpharmacological.
(d) the antagonist is labeled and the dose is subpharmacological.
Let r be the ratio of positron emission between (a) and (b), where this is
to be compared with the ratio r of emission activity between (c) and (d). The
variable r in each case is equivalent to the number of receptors that are occupied
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by agonist molecules, compared with the number of receptors that are occupied
by antagonist molecules. On purely physiological grounds, the ratio ought to be
the same in both cases (a/b and c/d) because the difference has only to do with
dose, and the doses are well below saturation. However, the subject is conscious
of the effects of the injection in the first case (i.e., the pharmacological dose),
but not in the second case (i.e., the subpharmacological dose). If rule (5) is
correct, then the drift of the conscious pulse in the first case should alter the
result by increasing the number of agonist molecules relative to the number of
antagonist molecules. We should therefore measure
r (between a and b) > r (between c and d)
thereby validating rule (5). This validation depends on a change in r that
cannot be accounted for on purely physiological grounds. There is reason to
believe that PET technology is up to this degree of accountability, or soon will
be.
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